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Encountering the stranger: Hannah Arendt and the shortcomings of empathy as 
a moral compass  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It is an often taken for granted notion in contemporary Western everyday life that there 
is an intimate connection between empathy and moral action. Yet in recent years, this 
connection has come under scrutiny. In this article, we first ask the question, what is 
empathy? A brief survey over the psychological and philosophical approaches to the 
notion of empathy shows that it remains a highly contested concept. The field has a 
propensity to discuss empathy within the frame of sameness. We instead argue that in 
order to grasp empathy it is necessary to foreground otherness. Drawing on Hannah 
Arendt, we further argue, that when encountering the stranger, moral action requires 
both visiting the other – as distinct from empathic knowledge as well as thinking in 
order to judge what is right. Ultimately moral dilemmas are solved, not by having or 
demanding empathy, but by addressing the issues at hand in joint action. 
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Any justification ends finally with the rationally gratuitous presence of the emotion of 
sympathy: if that condition were not met, one would simply have no reason to be moral. 
         (Thomas Nagel, cited in Denham, 2017 p. 227).   
 
 
On the 7th of September 2015 the Facebook feed of one of the authors was full of images of a man 
standing on a bridge spitting at a crowd of Syrian refugees crossing the border from Germany to 
Denmark. The caption read, that after spitting at the walking families, he yelled at them, telling 
them to go home, and that they were not welcome. Everyone in the Facebook feed was horrified by 
his behavior. People pointed out the immorality of his behavior and stressed that he lacked 
empathy, i.e. that he lacked the ability to put himself in the situation of the refugees and feel their 
suffering with them. In a similar vein, in a speech given in 2006, Barack Obama said: ”The biggest 
deficit we have in our society and in the world right now is an empathy deficit. We are in great need 
of people being able to stand in somebody else’s shoes and see the world through their eyes” 
(Bloom, 2016, p. 19). This corresponds nicely with the colloquial understanding of empathy, which 
is captured by Harper Lee in To Kill a Mockingbird, when Atticus tells Scout: “You never really 
understand a person until you consider things from his point of view – […] – until you climb into 
his skin and walk around in it.” (Lee 1960, p. 33). We choose to focus on the man spitting from the 
bridge to highlight the moral aspect of the common understanding of the notion of empathy – i.e. 
that empathy is usually called for in relation to someone in need of help or assistance and as a way 
of judging how to act towards them. Empathy is thus commonly taken to have a clear moral 
component.  
 
This article addresses the role of empathy when encountering the other – and more specifically an 
other who comes to our encounter with discernible or imagined differences in their ways of life, 
that is, a stranger. In such meetings, empathy is often called for as a solution to the confusion and 
potential conflicts such meetings may entail. We will argue that the call for empathy, rather than 
solving this issue, may in fact be a problematic call for more knowledge, that draws on notions of 
sameness. Related to this, it is a call for certainty - a certainty that cannot be established when 
acting in relation to an other. We will start by delineating different perspectives on empathy arguing 
that these approaches, whilst having fundamental differences, all draw on an inherent logic of 
sameness, i.e. that the other is similar to me. Furthermore, they predominantly understand empathy 
as a kind of knowledge – of the other and/or of the self. After considering other critiques and 
objections to empathy as a central moral compass, we turn to Hannah Arendt, and argue that 
visiting and understanding the other is important, but not sufficient, in order to judge what one 
ought to do. Instead, the ability to think and take responsibility in the face of perpetual uncertainty, 
is necessary in order to act morally well when encountering the other. 
 
The Concept of empathy: 
Since David Hume and Adam Smithi, empathy has generally been viewed as the ability to feel the 
suffering of the other and the general ability to know what it is like to be someone else. This ability 
has been commonly considered the foundation of moral action (Batson 1991; Hoffmann, 2000; 
Shoemaker, 2017). However, in recent years this assumption has been the target of much critique 
(Bloom, 2016; Maibom, 2009; Prinz, 2011a; Prinz, 2011b). There is thus considerable disagreement 
as to the relationship between empathy and moral action. To complicate matters, the field of 
research into empathy is broad and full of controversy, engaging both philosophical and 
psychological disciplines across a wide range of traditions. Consequently, there is no clear 
understanding of what exactly empathy is or to what extent it is related to and different from other 
concepts such as emotional contagion, motor mimicry, imaginative projection, or perspective taking 
(Zahavi, 2014, p. 101). In the following we turn to the concept of empathy and give a brief 
overview over some of the conceptions of empathy that exist in both psychological (primarily 
experimental) and philosophical literature. Subsequently we will take a closer look at the literature 
on the relationship between empathy and moral action. 
 
The term empathy (Einfühlung) was first used by the German philosopher Robert Vischer working 
in the domain of aesthetics and taken over by Theodor Lipps in the field of social cognition. The 
German word Einfühlung, means “feeling into,” or projecting oneself into something else. The term 
was used by Lipps to denote the capacity to understand others as minded, i.e. as thinking subjects. It 
was this use of the term that guided its introduction into the English language by psychologist 
Edward Titchener in 1909 (Zahavi, 2014). 
 
A common distinction in the literature on the concept of empathy is the between cognitive empathy 
and affective empathy (Maibom, 2017a). Cognitive empathy can be defined as “…the capacity to 
understand another person’s state of mind from her perspective” (Spaulding, 2017, p. 13). Piaget 
emphasized empathy as connected to the child’s development of the ability to decenter, i.e. the 
capability of distinguishing between the experiences of the self and experiences of the other (Davis, 
2017). Cognitive empathy is thus connected to notions of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen, 2005). 
Affective empathy, on the other hand, can be defined as “…a range of emotional responses we can 
have to what others feel or the situation they are in…” (Maibom, 2017b, p. 22) and as “…an 
emotion that is more appropriate to the state or situation of someone else than to that of the person 
who experiences it (Maibom, 2017b, p. 23). This means that the emotions of person A has to do 
with the perceived situation of person B (e.g. I am sad because my neighbor’s cat ran away, not 
because I had any relation to the cat, but because I respond to the sadness of my neighbor with 
sadness).  
 
However, this coarse distinction between the affective and the cognitive may be too simple. It 
allows theorists such as Bloom (2016), in his controversial bestseller “Against Empathy”, to make 
the claim that while he is not against the ability to consider what the world looks like and how it 
may be experienced from the other’s perspective. he does not consider this cognitive aspect 
empathy. Instead he constricts empathy to the phenomenon where, “…your suffering makes me 
suffer, […] I feel what you feel” (Bloom, 2016, p. 17). It is this affective phenomenon of sharing 
emotional states, of “feeling into” the other, that Boom criticizes as a moral guide. We shall return 
to Bloom’s arguments in a moment, but for now we will comment briefly on the inadequacy of this 
distinction. Although distinguishing between cognition and affect is alluring, it may not be tenable. 
As Martha Nussbaum (2001) argues, emotions (affectivity) are always bound up with judgements 
of values. Emotions are always about something. They are directed towards a world, and 
consequently “always involve thought of an object combined with thought of an object’s salience or 
importance.” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 23). We are angry because we perceive that we are treated 
unjustly, or we feel sad because we have experienced loss of something we deem valuable etc. 
Likewise, rationality/reason is never pure, but always bound to experience and to values. If we 
return to Maibom’s example of feeling sad when one’s neighbor’s cat runs away, then the affective 
response of sadness is bound up to the cognitive judgement that my neighbor actually liked her cat 
and didn’t want it to run away.  
 
The distinction between the affective and the cognitive thus appears untenable and most empathy 
theorist draw on more complex descriptions of the nature of empathy. These approaches may be 
roughly divided into the theory-theory of mind and the simulation theory of mind (Spaulding, 2017): 
 
Theory-theory of mind: According to the theory-theory of mind we attribute certain mental states to 
the other by drawing on a folk-psychological theory of mind, e.g. when we see the child, Susan, 
with a wrinkled-up facial expression, and acknowledge that there is a large dog, we draw on the 
general knowledge, that some dogs are dangerous and thus we can experience fear when 
encountered by a dog. Consequently, we deduce based on a general theory, that Susan is afraid.  
 
The simulation theory of mind theorist, on the other hand, claim that we base our understandings of 
others based on a model of our own minds. Some claim that this is done through imagination and 
deliberative inference, i.e. we imagine that we are Susan, project ourselves into her shoes, recognize 
that we would be afraid if we were her, and conclude that Susan is experiencing fear. For instance, 
autism-expert Simon Baron-Cohen, writes: 
“Empathy involves a leap of imagination into someone else’s headspace. While you can 
try to figure out other persons’ thoughts and feelings by reading their faces, their voices, 
and their postures, ultimately their internal worlds are not transparent, and to climb 
inside their heads requires imagining what it must be like to be them.” (Baron-Cohen, 
2005, p. 170).  
Others argue that this simulation is not conscious but implicit. This is the case with mirror-neuron 
theorists (e.g. Gallese, 2001), who would claim, that when seeing Susan and the dog, we would at a 
neuronal level experience fear in the same way as Susan does, simulating her fear. 
 
Summing up, simulation theory theorists argue that empathy is about feeling the same as the other, 
or cognitively theorizing that one would do or feel the same as the other, if one were in their shoes. 
Theory-theory theorists propose rather that empathy is about making sense of the other, grasping 
their reasons for feeling and doing as they do. This is done by drawing on a general theory of what 
people are like, i.e. a folk psychology of general human behavior. How we should understand the 
concept of empathy thus remains a point of contention. However, despite fundamental contrasts in 
perspectives, the above approaches all conceive of empathy as the ability to cross the gap between 
subjects and experience the world from their point of view. In each of these approaches, empathy is 
distinctively about understanding the other in a way that reduces dissimilarities and difference. It is 
about understanding the other as “someone who is like I am” or as “someone who is like people in 
general.” It is this propensity to sameness that we wish to challenge. By drawing on Hannah Arendt 
we will argue that moral judgement and action must build on a space of difference rather than 
sameness. But first we will present a brief overview over other critiques that have been raised 
against the notion of empathy as a key moral compass.   
 
 
Questioning the link between empathy and moral action 
The sceptics of a link between empathy and moral action often draw on simplistic or overtly 
different definitions of empathy than do the protagonists (Denham, 2017). This makes the 
discussion of the role of empathy in moral activity rather murky and inaccessibly contentious, if not 
to say litigious. Researchers, creating an overview of the research on the relationship between 
empathy and moral action, often conclude that whilst there is little uncontested experimental 
evidence to point to a clear causal relationship between empathy and altruism (Schramme, 2017), 
moral judgement (Kauppinen, 2017), moral motivation (Denham, 2017), or moral responsibility 
(Shoemakker, 2017), there seems to be some relation between empathy and moral action, although 
the exact relationship remains unclear. For instance, Kauppunin (2017) writes,  
“It is likely an exaggeration to claim that empathy is the “cement of the moral universe,” as 
Michael Slote (2010) does. […] But people who lack the ability to put themselves in the 
shoes of others and feel for them do appear to have trouble with moral insight and 
appreciating the grounds of pro-social moral principles, even if their rational powers are 
largely intact.” (P. 225).ii 
However, there are a range of critiques that carry some notability, and we shall here present an 
overview of these, arguing that empathy and whom we empathize with is a culturally embedded 
norm, that moral judgement and action does not necessarily require empathy, and that empathy is 
biased and consequently has a predilection to helping those that are similar to oneself. 
 
Empathy as culturally determined: Firstly, it has been argued that empathy is a culturally specific 
perspective on moral action, i.e. one rooted in western thinking. How we empathize, and what we 
empathize with, is a normative and culturally bound practice. Throughout history, and in different 
cultures, other approaches to moral judgements have been influential. The role of the laws of God, 
ideas of the natural order, or the idea that certain actions pollute one’s body, all act as moral guides 
(Maibom, 2009). Empathy is a (post)modern emotionalized perspective on morality that has 
received extra traction in a society that, through the rise of psychology as a discipline, has become 
increasingly focused on the roles of emotions in all aspects of life (see Furedi, 2004). On the other 
hand, Lynn Layton (2009) argues, that in a neo-liberal society, the individual is increasingly held 
responsible for themselves, yet not responsible for the other. This individualization inhibits 
empathy and the experience of solidarity. However, one could further argue that the call for 
empathy as a moral compass is exactly in tune with the neo-liberal individualization of 
responsibility – rather than arguing for political and social responses to suffering and injustice, the 
call for empathy is an individualized as well as an emotionalized response.    
 
Regardless of whether western cultures foster empathy or not, who we empathize with is culturally 
scripted with the effect of overlooking the suffering of particular others. For instance, Cynthia 
Burack (2006) studied homo-phobia in Christian fundamentalist groups. She shows, that this group 
does not see themselves as hate-filled, but rather as empathic and loving. They have, however, 
created an understanding of the world where some deserve empathy and others do not. Likewise, 
most readers of this article will, perhaps, subscribe to a world view, where such an understanding is 
reproachable, calling for empathy for homo-sexuals and not for Christian fundamentalists, who are 
deemed perpertrators who do not deserve empathy. Similarly, the introductory example of the man 
spitting on the refugees on the highway shows a cultural norm, where the refugees are deemed 
deserving of empathy, whereas the plight of the perpetrator, the suffering that prompts his heinous 
act (such as a worrying about jobs and pressure on the welfare state), does not elicit an empathy-
imperative. However, this does not absolve one of acting well towards this man, and certainly does 
not justify acting immorally towards him. The culturally scripted norms for who deserve empathy 
thus fall short as a moral compass in the face of those deemed as perpetrators. 
 
Moral judgement and empathy as non-contingent: Others point out, that we do not need to feel the 
emotions of others in order to know how to act morally well. This critique is directed towards those 
definitions of empathy that stress affective dimensions or simulation theorists who draw on mirror 
neurons to explain our ability to simulate the responses of others. The critique argues that we do not 
need to empathize with the refugees on the highway in order to know that spitting on them is 
morally wrong. Returning to the example of Susan and the dog, we do not need to be afraid 
ourselves in order know that it would be right to help the child who is afraid of the dog, in the same 
way as we do not need to feel the suffocation of drowning in order to know that it is right to save a 
boy struggling in a river. Instead, we draw on a variety of different skills and capacities to make 
these judgements. As Prinz (2011) writes: “My moral response is linked to action-types. If I classify 
your behavior as an instance of “stealing,” then that is enough to instill moral ire. Disapprobation 
can follow directly from certain types of action without any need to contemplate the suffering of 
victims” (p. 220). Additionally, research into the moral judgements of frontal lobe patients, who are 
characterized as lacking the ability to empathize with others, shows that these patients seem to 
grasp what is morally right and wrong, i.e. despite their impairment, they still maintain their 
capacity for moral judgement. However, they do seem to struggle with more flexible judgements, 
such as judging an incident that has created harm that was unintentionally provoked (Kauppinen, 
2017).  
 
Another notable critique of the relationship between empathy and moral judgements is that, as 
Scheler (2008) points out, the basic simulation or reproduction of emotions does not necessarily 
lead to insight. Instead it may lead to emotional overload and stress. Bloom (2016) has a similar 
point in his exposition of the problems of empathy. He argues that we become emotionally 
overburdened by having an empathic stance that requires mimicry or the reproduction of the other’s 
emotions. For instance, claiming that nurses need to feel the pain of their patients in order to act 
well, seems to be a non-sequitur, as nurses may very well be able to alleviate the pain of others in a 
practical manner without having to connect with them emotionally. Furthermore, this demand for 
empathy on professionals, risks resulting in emotional burn-out. The push for empathy may 
therefore in fact at times limit action, rather than motivate it, due to the experience of being 
overwhelmed by the emotions of the other.  
 
Empathy as biased and self-centered: Bloom (2016) further argues, that empathy, is inherently 
biased and unreliable and thus explicitly unsuitable as a moral compass. We tend to empathize with 
those closest to us and most similar to us, reacting more if a tragedy occurs to those in our own 
country than to tragedies occurring further away. Adam Smith was aware of this problem. 
Nussbaum (2014) quotes him at length reflecting on a European man’s reaction to the news on an 
earthquake in China. He writes that this man will feel a strong sorrow for the “misfortune of that 
unhappy people,” reflect upon this in great melancholy, and “when all this fine philosophy was 
over, when all these humane sentiments had been fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or 
his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as if no such 
accident had happened” (Smith cited in Nussbaum, 2014, p. 192).  
 
Empathy is thus insufficient as a moral guide at a political level, but also at a more personal level. 
For instance, Primo Levi (1988) writes, “…a single Anne Frank excites more emotion than the 
myriads who suffered as she did but whose image has remained in the shadows” (p. 56). Empathy 
may in fact even lead to selfish rather than altruistic action. Bloom (2016) argues, that empathy, if 
considered the reproduction of the emotions of another, does not motivate moral action, but the 
alleviation of pain for oneself. To illustrate this, he tells a story of a woman living near a 
concentration camp during the second world war. She could hear the screams of the victims during 
executions. Feeling the pain of the victims, she asked the authorities to stop executing them, or at 
least do it somewhere else! According to Bloom, her empathy motivated her to alleviate her own 
pain, not that of the victims.  
 
Empathy as de-contextualized and individualized: The concept of empathy may additionally entail 
an individualization and de-politization of interpersonal encounters. The societal diagnosis of an 
empathy-deficit in society, that we quoted from a speech by Barack Obama, is a rather 
individualized notion. For instance, the example of the man spitting at the refugees walking on the 
highway, was taken to indicate that the man lacked empathy. In fact, it could indicate a multitude of 
reasons and concerns. The man could be overwhelmed by fear of his own livelihood due to the 
pressure on the welfare state, economic struggles with competitions of jobs, poverty and so on. Or 
he could quite simply be a blatant racist, which is an ideological stance increasingly legitimized in 
current political discourses. These are not matters of individual empathy or lack thereof. These are 
political problems and should not merely be a question of pointing to individuals suffering, 
claiming need for more empathy.  
 
 
From empathy as ‘knowing the other’ to perpetual beginnings and the strangeness of the 
Other 
Summing up, the discussion of the connection between empathy and morality seems to address two 
particular issues, i.e. whether or not empathy is a necessary component to motivate moral or 
altruistic behavior (Denham, 20017) and whether empathy is necessary in order to judge right from 
wrong, that is judging the actions of others (Prinz, 2011b; Kauppinen, 2017). All their differences 
aside, many if not all, consider empathy as a way to reduce the potential strangeness of the other’s 
actions, i.e. it is a way to alleviate the discomfort connected to the uncertainty that arises in the face 
of difference. Seeing a scared girl makes us look for what scares her – seeing the big dog explains 
her fear to us. We would probably feel the same in her position. She and we are alike. We have 
reduced the strangeness of the situation and of the girl (the other).  
 
As argued above, theories of empathy tend to adhere to a logic of sameness. However, they also 
adhere to a logic of knowing the other. One approach to empathy that stresses difference yet still 
maintains the possibility of knowing is Dan Zahavis (2014) version of a phenomenological 
approach to empathy. He does not acknowledge the perspective that understanding the emotions of 
other requires experiencing these emotions ourselves. Instead, drawing on the work of Edith Stein, 
a student of Husserl, empathy may be understood as a form of other directed intentionality. Zahavi 
(2014, p. 107) argues that when faced with an other that is expressing emotions, we neither need to 
reflectively draw on theoretical inferences (as in the theory-theory approach) nor do we need to 
make subjective projections (as in the simulation theory approach) to understand these emotions. 
Instead, they are immediately given to us. Let us return to the example of the child, Susan, who is 
afraid of the dog. When I see her face, I do not see the mechanical motion of a contracted and tense 
facial muscles with wide eyes and a motionless body, after which I make the inferential 
interpretation that she is afraid. Her fear is given to me directly. No cognitive interpretation is 
needed. What I see is fear (Zahavi, 2014). I am subsequently drawn by her intentionality, follow her 
gaze and see that it is the dog that she is afraid of. Zahavi (2014; 2017) thus argues, that empathy is 
a form of social cognition where we are drawn by the other (i.e. an other directed intentionality), 
and understand the other directly and situated in a shared world. Although Zahavi emphasizes 
difference, in his theory, like the other theories of empathy described, empathy acts as a sort of 
knowledge that make it possible for us to make what seems strange and different, knowable, and if 
not identical, then at least therefore relatable.  
 
By drawing on Hannah Arendt, we will to argue for the inadequacy of the notion that empathy, 
understood as a way of knowing the other, as a prerequisite for moral action. Arendt was concerned 
with the question of how we make good judgements about how to act when encountering the other? 
Her answer is that we do so through understanding, that is distinct from knowing and that stresses 
difference. Arendt aspired to develop a “half way plausible theory of ethics” (1971, p. 216) in her 
work “The Life of the Mind.” In this article, we will focus on one aspect of her theory, namely the 
concept of understanding connected to her notion of visiting, arguing that the fundamental plurality 
and constant becoming of human beings hinders the possibility of knowing the other. Yet we can 
understand the other through visiting, which is a never-ending activity, i.e. understanding is an 
action not knowledge. In order to understand this, we first need to turn to her theory of action, 
natality and ‘being,’ and the ungraspable nature of the other. 
 
Hannah Arendt: Natality and the Plural  
One of Hannah Arendt’s most central concepts is the concept of plurality. She argues, that we live 
in a world of men not of man, and consequently in a world of difference: 
“Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, 
in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will 
live.” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 8). 
Arendt’s key concept of natality is closely connected to plurality. Having studied under Martin 
Heidegger in Marburg, Arendt broke with his phenomenology by developing the concept of natality 
that describes our ability to take initiative. Heidegger’s others are mere representatives and 
expressions of the existence of Dasein, that is being-in-the-world (Large, 2011). Contrary to this, 
Arendt stressed the fundamental nature of the uniqueness of others and plurality of mankind. Each 
human being is unique because of our ability to take initiative. It is because of our ability to bring 
something new into the world, i.e. to take initiative, and to begin, that the world is plural. In action, 
one starts something new: “To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin 
[…], to set something into motion” (Arendt, 1958/1998).  
 
It is in action, the mode of activity in which persons are together for the sake of togetherness, that 
the person appears as a unique individual. It is also through this beginning, that the subject risks 
disclosing itself. Initiative, in action, is the condition for appearing as a subject. She writes, “In 
acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world…” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 179). Subsequently, 
others respond to this beginning. The subject is thus never merely the doer, but also the sufferer of 
others’ beginnings. As Arendt writes: “Since action acts upon beings who are capable of their own 
actions, reaction, apart from being a response, is always a new action that strikes out on its own and 
affects others” (Arendt 1958/1998, p. 190).   
 
This disclosure or appearance of the subject is something intangible, or even ineffable. The other 
qua other is an irreplaceable self because of this momentary disclosure, that gives way for another 
new disclosure, and yet another, and so on. It is this constant beginning that makes the human world 
unpredictable and uncertain. The other is thus ultimately ungraspable in a constant becoming. 
Arendt writes, “The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray 
into saying what he is” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 181). As soon as we move to graspable categories, 
we present the other in an impoverished and reified way. Emmanuel Levinas captures this by 
writing, “If one could possess, grasp and know the other, it would not be other” (1987, p. 90). As 
Edith Stein pointed out, rather than experiencing the other as a joint sameness, the other comes to 
us, that is discloses themselves, as precisely other, and are thus not fully comprehensible. At this 
point we turn to the first central critique of the notion of empathy as a central moral compass, raised 
by Arendt’s theory, namely the propensity to sameness rather than difference inherent in the above 
described definitions of empathy. 
 
Sameness and difference 
“If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was 
or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves 
understood.” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 176) 
As argued above, the described concepts of empathy, however different they are, all, with the 
exception of Zahavis phenomenological approach, essentially ascribe to the notion of sameness: I 
feel the same, can draw on the same experiences, or can draw on the same logics as the other in 
order to understand the other. This shuts down the possibility of difference and consequently the 
possibility for the individuals unique appearing. In his work Totality and Infinity, Levinas has 
articulated the clearest critique of this affinity to sameness, calling the Western quest for total 
knowledge of being the “imperialism of the same” (Levinas, 2002, p. 87). According to the radical 
approach of difference proposed by both Levinas and Arendt, the very foundation of morality has 
nothing to do with comprehending the other, grasping their existence in coherent structures and 
reducing them to a something fathomable, something recognizable – reducing them to “sameness.” 
As Amiel-Hauser and Mandelson-Maoz (2014) write:  
“Under the presumption of empathy, people tend to dismiss aspects of difference and 
believe that they can truly know the subjective mindset of another person, sometimes 
even better than that person.” (p. 204). 
 
Arendt did not address the concept of empathy as such. She did, however, address the notion of 
compassion, which she defines as being “stricken with the suffering of someone else as though it 
were contagious” (Arendt, 1963, p. 85). This is thus similar to affective empathy or simulation 
theories of empathy. She critiques compassion as a moral guide, arguing that compassion closes 
down the space of difference rather than allowing for it, i.e. it closes down the space of unique 
appearing. She argues that compassion “sets out to change worldly conditions in order to ease 
human suffering,” and points out that “…it will shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of 
persuasion, negotiation and compromise,” (Arendt, 1973, p. 86-87), which is necessary for the 
space of difference and appearance. She argues instead for the active concept of understanding and 
of visiting the other, which we now will turn to.  
 
Visiting and understanding: 
For Arendt, the basic foundation for moral action is this recognition of “others as other to the other 
in a common world” (Hart, 2002, p. 99). Yet, although the other remains ungraspable, it is possible, 
in action, in this continuous disclosure described above, to visit the other. Visiting may seem very 
much like the imaginative capacity of those empathy-theorists who advocate a cognitive empathy 
involving projecting oneself into the shoes of the other, and for Arendt it does indeed require 
imagination. However, Arendt did not mean that this projection, this taking the perspective of the 
other, meant imaginatively feeling the other, projecting oneself into the shoes of the other, or 
entirely comprehending what the other may feel, think or do in a given situation. Rather, she 
advocates for the notion of visiting the other as distinct from the notion of empathy represented by 
simulation theory, as it maintains and stresses difference. Disch (1994) explains, “To visit, in other 
words, you must travel to new locations, leave behind what is familiar, and resist the temptation to 
make yourself at home where you are not” (p. 159). It does not involve becoming comfortable with 
the perspective of the other, making it your own. Where simulation theory assumes that I must 
already have the capacity to feel in a certain way, visiting is the possible discovery of other ways of 
being. 
 
Visiting is an aspect of understanding the other. Understanding is, for Arendt, linked to yet 
distinguished from knowledge, as it does not totalize and cannot reach conclusions. She describes it 
as a specifically human way of being alive. It is thus a particular way of engaging with the other in 
action, and is consequently “unending, and therefore cannot produce final results” (Arendt, 
1954/1994, p. 308). Understanding is action. It is a way of being with the other in a continuous 
visitation, striving to reconcile oneself with the plurality of the other, without forcing oneself to be 
at home, making the unfamiliar familiar. It is thus an ontological concept of being rather than an 
epistemological one of knowing. One cannot have an understanding – rather it is an activity, i.e. 
something that is done. 
 
Understanding has to do with coming to terms with the world, with the other, and reconciling 
oneself to a world where experiences, perspectives, values, opinions etc. that differ from my own, 
are possible. Arendt (1954/1994) critiques totalitarian explanations of the actions of others, “… 
because they submerge whatever is unfamiliar and needs to be understood in a welter of 
familiarities and plausibilities.” (p. 313). Empathy, when defined through a propensity to sameness, 
is one mode of explaining the other by drawing on such familiarities. So, rather than 
comprehending the other in any full and totalizing way, understanding has to do with coming to 
terms with the reality that the other experiences and inhabits our shared world differently than I. It 
is thus not about transforming the unfamiliar into the familiar, the different into sameness, the 
unpredictable into the predictable. Rather it is about a constant learning to live in a shared world 
with other people, unique and plural: 
“… an “understanding heart,” […] not mere reflection or mere feeling, makes it 
bearable for us to live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world, and 
makes it possible for them to bear with us” (Arendt, 1954/1994, p. 322).   
 
 
Certainty and Introspection:  
Connected to the call for the person to learn to live with difference and unfamiliarity, Arendt’s 
thinking dissolves the possibility of reaching certainty. The notion of empathy as a moral compass 
draws on the idea that one can know the other, and consequently make good moral decisions based 
on this knowledge. This may particularly be the case with the theory-theory approach, where 
general folk theories are used to deduce an understanding of the emotions and actions of the other. 
However, simulation theory approaches to empathy also adhere to the idea that one can know the 
other by simulating the emotions of the other, either through projection or through automated 
neuro-processes. According to Arendt this quest for knowledge of the other and desire for certainty 
is problematic because, as argued above, human being in action is inherently uncertain and 
unpredictable due to natality and perpetual beginnings. It is particular in ways that the general 
cannot capture. And it is unique in ways that I cannot simulate, comprehend or know in any 
totalizing fashion. As soon as we take a stance on the “right” comprehension of the mental state of 
the other, or the “correct” explanation for why an other does as she does, we reduce this other and 
make them into a static object. According to Arendt, as Nelson (2006) writes, in order to act 
morally well one “must also embrace the discomfort of uncertainty and the anxiety of 
unpredictability” (p. 89). This is why visiting the other and understanding can never be a finished 
activity – it is always open, allowing for the constant appearing of the other in unforeseen ways.    
 
Furthermore, Arendt critiqued the practice of introspection. The notions of empathy that adhere to 
the logic of sameness call for looking into oneself in order to understand the other. This is 
particularly the case with notions of affective empathy and simulation theories that consider 
empathy the ability to understand the other by imagining what one would do if in the same 
situation. After writing her dissertation on St. Augustine under the guidance of Karl Jaspers, Arendt 
wrote a biography on the life of Rahel Varnhagen, a Jewish woman born in 1771, living in Berlin, 
and leading a philosophical salon, which attracted some of Berlins leading thinkers, including the 
Humbolt brothers, as well as Hegel at a later date (Arendt, 1957/2000). In this biography, one finds 
the foundations of Arendt’s political thinking. She critiques Rahel for her “romantic inwardness,” 
writing, “to believe that by cultivation (Bildung) one can make a work of art of one’s life, was the 
great error of Rahel as well as her contemporaries” (p. 81). Arendt argues that this introspection 
results in worldlessness. Through introspection, man becomes concerned “only with himself” and 
“…is confronted with nothing and nobody but himself” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 280). This is of 
course an unreasonable critique of empathy, as no proponent of empathy as a central moral compass 
would argue that one should become preoccupied with oneself. But for Arendt introspection is 
worldlessness because the world disappears whilst the subject concentrates on oneself. Instead, it is 
worldliness, i.e. the ability to look out into the world, neither gazing into ourselves nor gazing into 
another, that is central to our ability to act well. It is the ability to engage in the activity of 
understanding the world from the perspective of an other that is the essential constituent of acting 
well when encountering the stranger. It is thus not merely understanding the emotions or thinking of 
the other, but also about understanding the conditions of the other, as well as their values, norms 
and position in society with all that this may entail. This is described by Benhabib (1995) who 
describes Arendts perspective in the following way:  
“Whereas the ability to judge the world as it appears to others and from many different 
points of view is the quintessential epistemic virtue in politics, romantic inwardness 
tends to eliminate the distinction between one’s own perspective and those of others 
through mood.” (p. 12).             
Worldliness, understanding the world from multiple perspectives, thus supersedes empathy, which 
merely calls for experiencing the world from the perspective of a single other by looking inward 
and reflecting on one’s own experience.  
 
Judgement, thinking and moral action: 
However, the activity of visiting the other, engaging in the activity of understanding in a way that 
opens up for the possibility of difference and constant appearing, does not in and of itself solve the 
problem of moral judgement and action in the encounter with the stranger. Understanding the other 
does not necessarily point to what we must do. Acting morally well does not necessarily entail 
fulfilling the wish of the other, although it of course does not exclude it. We will here briefly touch 
upon the Arendt’s ideas of thinking, and judging and how this is connected to moral action. Arendt 
points to the notion of judging that goes hand in hand with visiting. Hart (2002) describes Arendt’s 
perspective of visiting and judgement by arguing that,  
“…while putting myself in the place of the others, I do not simply replace my 
judgement with theirs; in fact, my judgement might not even be the same as theirs…. I 
retain my own voice and do not count noses in order to arrive at what is right” (p. 103).  
Acting morally well requires taking up ones responsibility by making independent judgements – by 
retaining one’s own voice. Understanding the other thus does not mean taking over their perspective 
of the world. 
 
Arendt points to thinking, as a necessary tool for making moral judgements, and the ability to act 
well. In her exposition of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (1963), Arendt was struck by what she 
termed the ‘banality of evil.’ Eichmann was not in any way vicious or diabolic. He was simply, 
according to Arendt, thoughtless. Thoughtlessness is not the same as stupidity. Thinking is for 
Arendt not “a highly developed intelligence or sophistication in moral matters, but rather the 
disposition to live together explicitly with oneself, to have intercourse with oneself, that is, to be 
engaged in that silent dialogue” (Arendt 1964/2003, p. 45). Thinking is thus, for Arendt, merely the 
faculty of engaging in an investigation.  
 
However, in ‘The life of the mind’ Arendt quotes Heidegger:  
“Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. Thinking does not produce 
usable practical wisdom. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.” 
(1971, p. 1). 
Hart (2002) explains the role of thinking for Arendt as follows:  
“Although thinking as an activity in such cases [ i.e. cases where “the center cannot 
hold… when the best lack all conviction while the worst are full of passionate 
intensity”] can put obstacles in the way of action, it itself is not an action and therefore 
is an ethics of impotence; it does not tell us what to do, but where to stop.” (p. 93 & 94). 
Thinking can thus suspend action and point out where action ought to stop. But it cannot point us 
further. Much like empathy, thinking on its own is an insufficient moral compass. Thinking in a 
distanced manner does not solve the problem. This must be undergone in joint action. 
 
In The Human Condition (1958/1998), Arendt shows that the verb “to act” has two corresponding 
words in both Greek and the Latin. In Greek the two verbs are archein which means “to 
begin/lead/rule” and pratein which means “to pass through/achieve/finish.” The Latin verbs are 
agere meaning “to set into motion/lead” and gerere meaning “to bear.” Arendt argues that each 
action was divided into two parts, “the beginning made by a single person and the achievement in 
which many join by “bearing” and “finishing” the enterprise, by seeing it through” (p. 189). Action 
is thus constituted by a doubleness: the singular beginning of a unique subject and the joint 
enterprise of seeing an activity through.  
 
This pertains to the argument we have been making in the following way: Rather than empathizing 
with the other in the sense of affectively feeling the other, or projecting oneself into the shoes of the 
other, risking the collapse of subjectivities into sameness, Arendt would point to the ongoing 
process of natality, where the other appears by starting/setting into motion. This is done by a unique 
singular human being. To act morally well in a given situation requires thinking about this 
beginning in a disconnected manner that allows one to stop if necessary, and to maintain one’s own 
position. Yet it simultaneously requires always seeking understanding of the other by visiting the 
other and allowing for continued appearance, and not diminish the other by receding to and settling 
on familiarities and sameness. This visiting is an action and not a passive stance of mere reception. 
Understanding has to do with coming to terms with plurality and accepting difference of 
experience, difference of values, difference of norms and difference of thought. Ultimately, the 
moral question is a question of solving the problem at hand – together, in action. The unique 
beginning (explored through understanding) and the joint bearing/finishing must be maintained 
simultaneously in action.   
Conclusion: 
For Arendt difference is an ontological condition. It is through perpetual beginnings that each 
individual appears as a unique individual. Difference is thus not merely an ontological condition for 
Arendt, but also a moral imperative. There ought to be spaces of difference. Without these spaces of 
difference social life would be totalitarian and would constitute a suppression and stifling of human 
being. If we return to the introductory example of the man spitting at the refugees on the high way, 
the general sentiment in the Facebook feed was that this man lacked empathy. One logical 
conclusion drawn from this could be to give the man empathy-training. This is in fact a common 
approach in moral education. There is a pervasive call in education for focusing on so-called ‘non-
cognitive skills’ that are connected to moral action (Gabrieli, Ansel & Krachman, 2015). The 
techniques used are for instance mindfulness, gratitude training and mentalization training. These 
all claim to enhance the empathy of pupils (see for instance Bak, Midgley, Zhu, Wistoft, & Obel, 
2015; Weare, 2010). However, the main point in this paper is that empathy in itself (and certainly 
knowledge in itself) cannot carry the burden of moral judgment. Instead, according to the theory of 
Arendt, moral education should strive to teach pupils to understand the world from multiple 
perspectives in a continuous never-ending manner, whilst developing their own voice and ability to 
take responsibility.  
    
Furthermore, the approach we have described above has implications for all practitioners who 
encounter the stranger, be it psychologists, educationalists, law enforcers, nurses etc. We have 
argued that a central problem concerning empathy and moral action is the way in which empathy – 
as well as what one ought to do – becomes a knowledge endeavor. Knowing the other and knowing 
what is right. It becomes a matter of achieving a sense of certainty. In such a view action must be 
delayed until clarity is achieved. Not only does life ‘go on’ without waiting for such clarity to 
appear, but the idea of possessing the means to know beforehand what is right excludes the fact that 
the other and the self are unique individuals that differ. This also has consequences for working 
with refugees and ethnic minority groups in a variety of different professions. It means that the call 
for professionals to emotionally engage with the suffering of others, often leading to emotional 
burnout, may be exaggerated (Bloom, 2016). Instead the approach of Arendt calls for professionals 
that create spaces of appearance – i.e. refrain from creating simple stagnant narratives of who the 
other is (someone just like me, or someone acting just like anyone else would in their position).  
 
Creating spaces of appearance means allowing the other to disclose herself as a unique without the 
totalizing endeavor of knowing the other. And only by joint action is it possible to act in relation to 
that difference or otherness. Understanding, thinking and taking responsibility are key components 
in moral action. This includes issues of values, morals and social justice. These are all issues that 
psychology as a discipline struggle with. We want to stress the need for a psychology that explicitly 
deals with values and discusses moral questions as well as the role of the discipline in issues of 
justice, equity and dignity. 
 
Acting well in the face of difference is thus not about knowing – but understanding – the other; and 
not feeling his or her feelings, but visiting, enduring the agonizing unpredictability and uncertainty. 
This requires a perpetual acknowledgement of the fundamental difference and plurality of the other 
in our shared world. And it requires the risky business of taking responsibility as a unique 
individual through continuous moral value judgements. The discomfort of the unpredictable and 
uncertain world cannot be dissolved. One can only come to terms with it. 
 
 
 
i David Hume and Adam Smith, writing in the 1700’s, both believed that the core capacity to enter 
into and share the emotions of others was central to social life specifically and humanity in general. 
Both denoted this capacity “sympathy.” For a discussion of their understanding of sympathy and the 
relationship to the contemporary term “empathy,” see Ilyes (2017).      
ii The definition of empathy in this quote is a case in point about the problems regarding the unclear 
notion of what empathy actually consists of. Here Kauppinen slides into a commonsense definition 
that has to do with putting oneself in the shoes of another – yet there is not clarity of what this 
exactly entails.   
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